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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD L. JENSEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs .
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GARY DeLAND, Director,
Department of Corrections,
Utah State Prison,
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
The Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery in the
Third Judicial District Court.

His conviction was affirmed by

this Court in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986).
He subsequently filed a pro se petition of habeas corpus in
the Third Judicial District Court.
without evidentiary hearing.

The petition was dismissed

Petitioner then filed an appeal with

this Court and subsequently filed his Appellant's Brief pro se.
The State filed its Brief in response on September 27, 1988.
On November 8, 1988 Petitioner's present counsel entered an
appearance and requested an extension of time to file a reply
brief.

At that time it was unknown to Petitioner's counsel that a

hearing had been scheduled on the merits of this case. On
November 14, 1988 Petitioner's counsel appeared before this Court
and requested that a Reply Brief be allowed in this matter and
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that any further decision be stayed until such time as the Reply
Brief had been filed.

The Court granted Petitioner's motion to

file a Reply Brief on or before November 28, 1988.
Petitioner's opening brief was filed pro se and addresses the
substance of his claims rather than the procedure in the lower
court.

The brief of the State, on the other hand, focuses solely

upon the procedural bars that it claims prohibits this action from
being brought.

This Reply Brief will, therefore, address these

procedural claims raised by the State and will only, in passing
discuss the substantive arguments originally raised by Petitioner
pro se.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In order to fully understand the procedural contentions made
in this case by the State it is necessary to briefly review the
procedure which occurred in the court below regarding the habeas
corpus petition.
On December 5, 1986 Richard L. Jensen filed a "Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus" pro se in the Third Judicial District
Court.

In his petition he alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel based upon some fourteen specific claims; prosecutorial
misconduct based upon six alleged claims; and error by the court
based upon four claims.
hereinafter HR).

(Habeas Corpus record pp.

2-7;

At the same time he also filed an "Affidavit in

Support of Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis" (HR 9-10), an
"Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" (HR 11), a "Motion for
Appointment of Counsel and Preparation of Petitioner's Court File
and Supporting Records" (HR 12), and an "Affidavit" listing the
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court file and supporting records which he requested from the
state to be supplied to him.

(HR 13-14) .

On December 18, 1986 an assistant attorney general filed a
motion to dismiss in this case based upon the claim that the
matter was still on direct appeal and therefore that the habeas
corpus petition was premature.

(HR 15).

On December 22, 1986 Richard L. Jensen filed a "Motion to
Ignore Respondent's Motion to Dismiss" based upon the fact that
the decision had in fact been decided by this Court on October 8,
1986 and therefore the habeas corpus relief was proper.

(HR

39-41) .
On January 9, 1987 an Amended Motion to Dismiss was filed by
the State on the basis that the Petition failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

(HR 62). A Memorandum in

support of this motion was filed at that time.

(HR 55-57).

A

Notice of Hearing was also filed at the same time setting forth a
hearing to be held on January 23, 1987.

(HR 63).

On January 13, 1987 Richard Jensen filed a "Motion for
Appointment of New Counsel" claiming a conflict of interest
between himself and Phillip Jones and requesting that counsel
outside of the Legal Defenders Office be appointed.

(HR 65-66).

On January 23, 1987 Richard L. Jensen, pro se, submitted
to the lower court a "Memorandum in Rebuttal to Respondent's
Amended Motion to Dismiss." (HR 72-75).

Attached to this

Memorandum was an "Affidavit as to Correctness of Supreme Court
Appeal" signed by his previous appellate attorney Earl Xiaz (HR
76); two letters written to Petitioner by Mr. Xiaz concerning his
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direct appeal (HR 77-78); and a copy of a previous motion entitled
"Motion for Order to Produce Document to Perfect Addendum to
Supreme Court Appeal" filed September 2, 1986.

(HR 79-80).

On January 23, 1987 a hearing was held before the Honorable
Richard H. Moffat.
the record.

A transcript of that hearing is provided in

(Hereinafter Tr.).

On January 28, 1987 the lower

court entered a minute entry granting Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss.

(HR 71).

February 6, 1987.

A formal order of dismissal was entered on
(HR 83-84).

A notice of appeal from this order

was filed on February 11, 1987.

(HR 85).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER
FROM BEING
BECAUSE OF
HIS DIRECT

IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED
GIVEN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN
APPEAL.

The respondent claims that this habeas corpus action could
not be initiated because "Petitioner knew or should have known at
the time of the appeal of the existence of the errors alleged in
his petition." (Respondent's Brief, p.

6). Although the rule

cited by the Attorney General is correct as to any issues
specifically addressed by this court in his direct appeal, it has
no application to the majority of Petitioner's claims. The
following analysis of this case reveals this error.
It is fundamental that habeas corpus proceedings are civil in
nature.

Ludahl v. Larson, 586 P.2d 439 (Utah 1978); Farrell v.

Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah 1971).

Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure specifically apply to habeas corpus and
post-conviction hearings.

The rules require an incarcerated
-4-

petitioner to "set forth in plain and concise terms the factual
data constituting each and every manner in which the complainant
claims that any constitutional rights were violated." 65 B(i)(2).
The Rules also require him to state any prior proceedings which
have occurred concerning those claims both direct appeals and
habeas corpus actions,

(Id,).

The rule, however, does not

require a petitioner to explain which claims were brought or could
have been brought on direct appeal or to explain why such claims
were omitted-

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 4-6).

The contention of the State is based upon a theory of waiver
i.e., the failure to raise an issue on appeal waives any right to
bring it up on a collateral attack.
816, 820-21 (Utah 1980).

Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d

Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

waiver is an affirmative defense to be plead in answer to a
complaint.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Dezner v.

Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976).
Under Rule 65B(6) within ten days after service of the
complaint the attorney general "shall answer the complaint or
otherwise plead thereto." In the instant case the attorney general
chose to file a motion to dismiss rather than an answer.
Essentially, the attorney general claimed that the failure of
Petitioner to justify the absence of raising these contentions on
direct appeal failed to state a claim under Rule 65B. The
respondent further states in its brief before this Court:
On appeal, Petitioner adds to his argument that
his apellant counsel must have been ineffective since
counsel did not raise on direct appeal the issues now
asserted by Petitioner. However, because Petitioner
failed to claim ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel in his petition below, he should be precluded
-5-

from raising that issue on appeal. State v.
Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983).
(Respondent's
Brief at p. 6 ) .
It is the contention of the petitioner that a waiver claim
cannot be made the basis of dismissing a habeas corpus petition
without an inquiry by the lower court as to what issues were
actually raised on direct appeal and as to what reasons, if any,
such issues were not raised.

It is not the burden of the

petitioner to anticipate the defense of the state but rather it is
the obligation of the state to raise these contentions so that the
petitioner can answer them.

Furthermore, subparagraph 8 of Rule

65B(i) specifically provides that the Court "in each case" shall
enter "specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and
judgment, in writing," which again supports Petitioner's
contention of a specific inquiry being made.
In the instant case the lower court had before it a clear
explanation as to why the claims being asserted by Petitioner in
the habeas corpus proceeding had not been raised on direct appeal.
In his memorandum in rebuttal to Respondent's Amended Motion to
Dismiss he attached an affidavit which was made by his previously
appointed direct appeal attorney, Earl Xiaz.
which is attached herein as Appendix A ) .

(HR 76; copy of

The affidavit was

prepared by Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal because he
was aware of the rule in habeas corpus proceedings concerning
waiver and was concerned that the contentions that Petitioner
raised in his habeas corpus action should have been raised in the
direct appeal.

The affidavit clearly shows that the points were

left out in direct appeal because of the advice of his
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court-appointed attorney and that his attorney stated, "I take
full responsibility for my client's failure to bring up his other
points."
Furthermore, during the habeas corpus proceeding itself
Petitioner stated the following to the lower court judge:
As to her [the assistant attorney general] point
about collateral issues or the points about these
issues should have been raised on direct appeal; as you
see in my rebuttal to her argument, that I made
numerous attempts to actually raise these issues. The
issues she says should have been on direct appeal; I
wrote my lawyer numerous times, I made him sign an
affidavit that he knows what he is doing. So what
they're arguing is, that the state appointed me
ineffective counsel, because I asked for those other
points to be brought up on my direct appeal. And he
told me that these points did not fit in the appeal
process. (Tr• 7) .
* * *

And I did not feel that he did right. My hands
were tied. He was my attorney and he refused to put my
points in. (Tr. 8).
See also, Petitioner's Opening Brief, pp. 21-23.
Assuming for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss that
Petitioner's explanation of what occurred on direct appeal is
correct, a prima facie rebuttal had been made to the waiver
argument.

As noted by this Court:

In this case we refuse to indulge the fiction
(contrary to the alleged facts) that the petitioner
failed to assert a right when, allegedly, it was his
attorney who failed to do so, and then on the basis of
that default imposed the adverse consequence on
petitioner himself. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341,
344 (Utah 1980.) (Emphasis in original).
The order of the lower court does not specifically mention
the waiver issue unless such finding can be implied by the
language that the court "finds that the petition fails to state a
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claim upon which relief may be granted," (HR 83).

If the question

of waiver was in dispute then the lower court should have called
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of allowing Appellant's
direct appeal attorney to testify as to the circumstances
surrounding the apeal and whether the contentions raised by
Petitioner in the habeas corpus proceeding were in fact attempted
to be raised by him in the direct appeal.

After such an

evidentiary hearing the court could then enter specific findings
and conclusions as to the waiver contention of the state.

If, on

the other hand, the court was satisfied by the existing record and
affidavit of Mr. Xiaz that the petitioner had done everything he
could do to preserve his claims on direct appeal then the waiver
claim should have been discarded by the court and Petitioner
should have been allowed to proceed with those claims not
addressed in the direct appeal.
In summary, therefore, Petitioner contends that the record
now before this Court does not justify a finding of waiver on
direct appeal and that either, as a matter of law, no waiver
exists or, in the alternative, the matter should be remanded for
an evidentiary hearing.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE A CLAIM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MAGNITUDE.
The lower court in its order of dismissal stated the
following:
The purpose of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
65B(i) is to allow a plaintiff to raise claims of
fundamental unfairness at trial or of substantial and
prejudicial denial of constitutional rights. The
-8-

claims raised by plaintiff fail to rise to the level of
fundamental unfairness contemplated by Rule 65B(i) and
so fail to rise to the level required for relief to be
granted. (HR 83)
It is fundamental that a plaintiff in a habeas corpus action
is entitled to have the facts alleged reviewed in the light most
favorable to him.

Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980).

The only issue before an appellate court on appeal from an order
granting an ordinary motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is whether it can be said that there is no state of facts
which plaintiff could prove entitling him to relief under his
claim.

Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291 (Wash.

1975).

In matters involving incarcerated prisoners the United States
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5 (1980) stated even a

stronger standard:
Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner
complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois,
was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that
the allegations of such complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded" are held "to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . ." Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). See also, Maclin v.
Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980); French v. Heyne,
547 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1976).
Such a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Haines, supra, at 520-21. And, of course, the
allegations of the complaint are generally taken as
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Id^ at 9-10.
As noted by the State in its brief there were three central
claims alleged by Petitioner in the habeas corpus action: (1)
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) prosecutorial
misconduct; and (3) trial court error.
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.

4-6).

It is the contention of the petitioner that he is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing on these claims unless this Court can
say, as a matter of law, that under no set of facts or
circumstances can these claims give rise to a constitutional
deprivation.
It is clear from reviewing the transcripts of January 23,
1987 that the lower court never made any factual inquiry as to the
claims asserted by the petitioner-

No request for clarification

as to any of these claims were made.

No findings of fact or

conclusions of law were entered as to any of the specific claims
since the habeas corpus petition was dismissed as a matter of law
for failure to state any claim.
Admittedly, the factual allegations contained in the habeas
corpus petition were not always clearly stated.

In some instances

it is difficult to understand exactly what facts Petitioner was
relying upon in making his claims.

In other instances, however,

it is quite apparent the claim being asserted.

However, the

inability of the petitioner to artfully plead his petition should
not be held against him especially in a pro se petition.
At the least, the lower court should have made a factual
inquiry of the petitioner concerning his claims or should have
given him an opportunity to explain exactly what he intended by
each claim.

The lower court in this case failed to give

Petitioner any opportunity to clarify the factual context upon
which the claims were based.

In fact, Petitioner had never

received the documents he requested from the Court, was in a state
of limbo as to whether or not a new attorney would be appointed to
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assist him at the hearing, and had less than two weeks to attempt
a pro se response to the State's motion to dismiss.
Aside from these procedural irregularities, the general claim
of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel should
have in and of itself required an evidentiary hearing regardless
of the specifics of the pleadings made by the petitioner.

As

noted by the Supreme Court of Nevada:
A claim of ineffective trial counsel is generally
based on factual allegations which must be explored at
an evidentiary hearing. Consequently, a claim of
ineffective trial counsel is properly raised in
proceedings for post-condition relief. Because of the
usual need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve a
claim of ineffective counsel, the failure to raise the
claim on direct appeal does not constitute a waiver of
the claim for purposes of post-conviction proceedings.
Daniels v. State, 688 P.2d 315, 316 (Nev. 1984).
(Emphasis added).
This same principle was expounded by this Court in
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979) in which a
petitioner claimed that his lower court counsel had been
ineffective.

The state in that case moved to dismiss the

petition arguing that the issues should have been raised on
timely appeal and that habeas corpus was not available as a
substitute for regular appellate review.

The Court in ordering a

hearing be held stated:
By our decision herein we do not mean to be
understood as suggesting or even implying that the
petitioner's allegations are true. (We interpose the
observation that Mr. Caine is an attorney of good
repute who has had considerable practice in the field
of criminal law). But in the face of a motion to
dismiss, the court should regard them as true, deny the
motion, and proceed to determine the facts.
Considering the petition in the light of what has
just been said, it is our conclusion that it warrants
inquiry into and determination as to the facts alleged.
-11-

Id, at 702.

(Emphasis added).

Even in the case relied upon by the State, Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) a specific evidentiary hearing
was conducted by the lower court as to petitioner's claim that he
was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

While this

Court, in reviewing the transcript of the evidence taken in that
proceeding, concluded that counsel was not ineffective, it
nevertheless concurred that the lower court was in the best
position to evaluate the claim.

See also, Johnson v. Morris, 645

P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) (hearing held on claim of incompetence of
counsel and without transcript of proceeding lower court judgment
presumed correct).
As recently as October 26 of this year this Court in Bundy v.
DeLand, 94 Utah Adv.

Rep.

9 (October 26, 1988) distinguished

claims which could be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing
from those claims which required such a hearing.

In that case the

petitioner claimed nine specific instances of ineffective counsel.
This Court noted:
If counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently
grievous to deprive plaintiff of effective assistance
of counsel, they constitute a violation of due process
that is clearly reviewable by habeas corpus review.
While several of these claims might reasonably have
been raised on direct appeal under the Brown v.
Turner/Cordianna v. Morris standard, we are now in the
most appropriate position to review the claims in that
a record was established in the evidentiary hearing
below. Id. at p. 10.
This Court affirmed the lower court's decision since "the
evidence supports the district courtfs findings and conclusions
that Plaintiff's claims are without merit, including the claim
that his counsel was inebriated at trial."
-12-

Id. at 11.

The claims of Petitioner regarding his counsel in the lower
court clearly require that an evidentiary hearing be held.

It

cannot be said, as a matter of law, that under no set of
circumstances or facts produced by Petitioner could relief not be
granted.
Petitioner claimed inadequate investigation by his trial
counsel.

The California Supreme Court in discussing a claim that

trial counsel failed to properly investigate the facts of the case
stated this rule:
Where the record on its face discloses that
counsel failed to investigate the facts in the manner
required of a diligent and conscientious advocate, the
conviction must be reversed because the defendant
thereby has been deprived of adequate assistance of
counsel. On the other hand, if the record fails
affirmatively to disclose counsel's incompetence, the
factual elicitation in a habeas corpus evidentiary
hearing is the proper procedural remedy by which to
test the competency issue. People v. Fierson, 599
P.2d 587, 597.
The following cases, in addition to those previously cited,
stand for the proposition that habeas corpus relief will be
granted to a petitioner if the facts and circumstances justify
substantiation of the same type of claims asserted by petitioner
in his habeas corpus petition.
(Cal.

See, In Re Hall, 637 P.2d 690

1981) (petitioner was denied adequate representation of

counsel by his attorney's failure to adequately investigate the
case and to challenge identification procedures utilized by
police); People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 (Cal.

1987) (writ of

habeas corpus granted when defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel for failing to undertake adequate factual
investigation and legal research and for failing to move to
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suppress improperly admitted evidence); U.S.
659 (2d Cir.

v. Baynes, 687 F.2d

1982) (counsel was ineffective in failing to

introduce evidence challenging identity of defendant in tape
recording); Vella v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.

1983)

(counsel was ineffective when he allowed prejudicial evidence as
to the murder victim's good character to be introduced at trial);
Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F.Supp.

901 (D. Miss.

1980) (counsel was

ineffective in failing to obtain witnesses as to the credibility
of the chief prosecution witness, and in failing to request
instructions warning of the danger of accomplice testimony);
McQueen v. Swensen, 560 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir.

1977) (counsel

ineffective when he failed to conduct investigation and failed to
call critical witness requested by petitioner); Code v.
Montgomery, 725 F.2d 1316 (11th Cir.

1984) (petitioner entitled

to evidentiary hearing to develop facts relevant to claim that his
attorney failed to investigate and present at trial his alibi
defense).
Moreover, the evidentiary hearings in both Cordianna and
Bundy also addressed the issues of failure to investigate
defense, failure to make objections and to properly instruct, and
failure to present requested evidence.
The other claims asserted by Petitioner concerning
prosecutorial misconduct and lower court error can also be grounds
for habeas corpus relief assuming that waiver on direct appeal did
not occur and assuming that such errors were prejudicial.
Appellant's opening Brief pages 14-20).

(See,

Again, the validity of

these claims require an opportunity for Petitioner to present the
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facts and circumstances to the lower court either by way of
affidavit, memorandum, or in-court testimony.

He is entitled to

have the file available to him so he can adequately prepare his
claims.

He was denied this request and therefore could not have

been prepared for the January hearing in any event.
In conclusion, while the State claims that "when closely
examined, none of the claims raised by Petitioner rise to the
constitutional level" such a statement is clearly incorrect since
some of the claims if factually proven would give rise to habeas
corpus relief.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 7). Both the Attorney

General and the lower court, therefore, have arbitrarily decided
based upon mere allegations alone that Petitioner has no claim for
relief even though the types of claims asserted by Petitioner can
give rise to relief under proper circumstances.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court could not, as a
matter of law, find under the existing record that Petitioner
could not establish a claim of fundamental unfairness which under
any set of circumstances would not justify relief under Rule 65B.
CONCLUSION
The procedure in habeas corpus proceedings must be carefully
guarded by this Court since there is clearly a tendency of lower
courts to speedily adjudicate them because of the large numbers
filed each year.

In the instant case Petitioner made a continued

and strong effort to urge his court-appointed appellate counsel to
raise numerous issues on direct appeal which were not raised in
the appellantfs Brief.

Petitioner in this case because of his

fear of preclusion in a later proceeding even went so far as to
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require his appellate attorney to sign an affidavit stating that
the decision to raise only one issue on appeal was totally that of
the court-appointed counsel.
In the habeas corpus proceeding Petitioner was met with the
very argument he feared during his direct appeal.

The lower

court, contrary to Rule 65B, entered no specific findings or
conclusions concerning the waiver argument of the state but merely
held that the petition "failed to state a claim." The record now
before this Court, however, shows that the question of waiver
should have been examined by the lower court and dealt with in an
evidentiary hearing in which the extent of Petitioner's efforts to
raise these issues could be examined.

It was clearly error to

base any denial of habeas corpus relief upon such waiver without a
full inquiry having been made.
Second, contrary to Rule 65B(8) the Court failed to enter
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law even though the
rule speaks in terms of "in each case." The lower court erred in
concluding without any hearing or examination of the facts in this
case that Petitioner's claims were insubstantial and did not
result in a prejudicial denial of constitutional rights. Whether
such claims will withstand a full factual inquiry is not the issue
in this case.

The issue is simply whether a petitioner who

alleges a legally sufficient claim is entitled to present his
factual evidence before a lower court with adequate documentation
provided by the Court, with the assistance of counsel, and with
adequate time before the petition is denied on the basis that the
claims cannot be substantiated.

This is not a case in which

-16-

Petitioner brought claims which, under no circumstances, could
ever result in violation of constitutional rights.
For these reasons, therefore, this Court should remand this
matter to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of November, 1988.

Craig S. Ctfbk
Attorney for PetitionerAppellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to Dan R. Larsen,
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this 28th day of November, 1988.

.JkuutJ&jl&A-
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APPENDIX

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDAVIT AS TO CORRECTNESS
OF SUPREME COURT APPEAL.

Xiaz, the Attormey in the above Affidavit state:
Tha^g^T realize that my Client may not use the remedy of a Habeas
Corpus as a substitute for a Direct Appeal. That a petitioner
cannot raise issues in a Habeas proceeding that could or should
have been raised on Direct Appeal.
My Client has had the desire to raise other issues like,
Ineffectiveness of Counsel, T.TI ^^1 r>opnfii +H nr* t improper Off ear of
Bviderice, Prooccutor!o Failure lo Dincloo^ 5v4rde**»e- Favorable to my
Giient, and ByoWitness-Fragility Inatuuilicin, but I have discouragedhim from going in that direction because I feel it would bo a wnste n
of-t-jgie-and they, are very weak-podbn^e fur thia Direct Appeal remedy* '*^^v
They do not fit the rules for Direct Appeal points.
Au/Ji^y in tkx. r-*<«*J
My Client under my direction had left the-^e pointy out * S/^y^'i
because I have advised him to. If at a later date there arises a^^j^J^
controversy from another court, I take full responsibility for my/*\ UAZL
Clients1 failure to bring up h±s- cliier point/*
*A-.~/ c^ w
\K\

'

/

'l

< J ,,

I~-s±gnr-i±t^^
^ ^.
Sessional .ethics -and Jaiowledge^of^the Direct Appeal- process-and
Jj p^eeedures. i&Ri will be available at any time to answer any quest- "^ "'
ions as to my judgements in Richard L. Jensens1 Supreme Court Appeal
or any other remedy.

EARL X I A Z A t t b ^ n e ^ / At Law
WITNESS:

To Signing

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING AT:
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES

YENGICK RICH, XAIZ & METOS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
7 2 E. 4 0 0 SO.. SUITE 3 5 5
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 11
T E L E P H O N E (801) 355-0320

*ONALD J . YENGICH
&RADLEY P. R I C H
IARL XAIZ
5. F R E D M E T O S

April 17,

1986

Richard Jensen
P.O. Box 250-17541
Draperr Utah 84020
Attorney/Client Correspondence
Re:

Supreme Court Appeal

Dear Richard,
Word has reached me through messages from you and your
sister that there is a problem with the brief I have left with
you. Please keep in mind the fact that the brief is due on May
3rd, 1986. I need at least one week prior to that date in order
to have the brief proof-read and printed. Please let me know
what's up as soon as possible.
Very truly yours ,

EARL XAIZ
EX/hab

YENGICH. RICH, XAIZ & METOS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
7 2 E. 4 0 0 SO., SUITE 3 5 5
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
T E L E P H O N E (801) 355-0320

!ONALD J . YENGICH
IRADLEY P. R I C H
ARL XAIZ
J. F R E D M E T O S

August 18, 1986

Richard Lawrence Jensen
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah
84020
Attorney/Client correspondence
Dear Richard:
I am in agreement with you on your assessment of the
Attorney General's brief. It is as weak a response as I have
seen.
With regard to a reply brief, it is my policy not to reply
unless the Attorney General raises an issue or argument that
we failed to, or did not, raise in our brief. However, I realize
that your approach to this appeal is somewhat different than
mine. Therefore, I suggest that you write something up as
quickly as possible and get it to me. I will then read it and
get back to you so that we can file within the 30 days that we
have.
Finally, although I believe that our communication channels
have improved over the last few months, it appears that you are
still somewhat apprehensive concerning my feelings towards you.
Nevertheless, I will continue, as I have all along, to do the
best I can to represent your interests.
Please respond as soon as possible.
Sincerely,

EARL XAIZ
EX/cmc
in***

00"^

V_fV\]<r?l

Richard L. Jensen
P.O. Box 250
Jraper, Utah 84020

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
STATS OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

:
:

MOTION FOR ORDER TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS TO PERFECT APDENDEM
TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL.

vs.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CR85-348.
RICHARD L. JENSEN
Defendant,

:
:
JUDGE:

Judith Billings

COMES NOW, RICHARD L. JENSEN, the Defendant in the above
cs.ptioned case, and states he is unlearned in the law, acting Pro Se
for himself. He asks the Court to take this fact into consideration,
and accordingly apply the "less stringent standards," set dovm in Haines
v. Ko.-iraer, 404 US 519 925. CT 594, 30 LED, 2d 252 (1972).
RICHARD L. JENSEN, hereby MOVES this Court for an Order
x.o produce for inspection and copy, the following documents:

D

Copy of the Minute Entries of Instant Case and complete file.
2) Copy of Orginal Handwritten Police Reports of the Instant Case,
.5) Transcript: of Sentencing Hearing held on Oct. 21, 1985.
4) Transcript of Closing Arguments of Instant Case.
£
Copy of Receipt for Property taken from the Defendant amd use as
->)
Evidence in the trial# Note; U.C.A. 77-24-5•
6) Copy of the Pre-Sentence Report.

7)

Copy of Notice from Prosecution concerning the use of the Defendants1
Alibi Witness Terri Harris as States1 witness also. According to
U.C.A. 77-14-2 (2),(3).

The Defendant has requested for these documents from past
counsel and present counsel, hut has been selectively ignored by both.
JJee: Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, DR 2-110 a ) .
RICHARD L. JENSEN, PRAYS, this Court will ORDER these documents be produced. That the Court will secure his rights under the Constitution of the State of Utah and the United States.
If this matter cannot be resolved by Order from the Court,
then the Defendant requests a hearing, to discuss why the Court would
refused him to investigate his own case in order to defend himself for
the reason of adding an Addendem to his Supreme Court Appeal. DATED
AND SIGNED, this g,
Day of ggpfrn-bre
1986.

RICHARD L. JENSEN

Pro Se

:hard 1. Jensen
C. Box 250
iper, Utah 8402G

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
El AND poR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
.?£ UF UTAH

Criminal Case No. CR85-348.
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS with included APPIDAVIT
OP IMPECUNIOSITY.

BX<D L. JENSEN
Defendant•
JUDGE:

Judith Billings

COlCiCD NOW, RICHARD L. JENSEN, and being duly sworn, deposes
3h.ys: 1) lhat he is the Defendant in the above entitled case and
t; 2) He is impecunious and without funds, securities or credit with
ch to prepay the costs of filing and maintaining this action to consic•n.
THEREFORE, Petitioner-Affiant, RICHARD L. JENSEN, hereby
E3 this Court bo allow him to proceed in Porma Pauperis.

SWORN TO, DATED AND SIGNED this
£
Day of eep^. , 1986.

RICHARD L. JENSEN
Petitioner

Pro Se

N O T A R I Z A T I O N

"SUBSCRIBE! AND SWORN TO before me t h i s

.j

Day of J/jf.

T

1986.

RESIDING AT:
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

M A I L I N G

CERTIFICAl'

ION

"I hereby certify that I caused true and exact copies of the accompanying
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS with included AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOUS ITY: and the MOTION FOR ORDER TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS TO PERFECT ADDENDEM TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL; to be mailed U.S. postage prepaid, to each
of the following; 1) H. Dixon Hindley, Clerk, The Third District Court
for Salt lake County, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110;
2) Juage Judith Billings, Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City Utah 84110, on this A
Day of
if/../
, 1986.

UTOHARDL!\

JENSENP

'G"^J

